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Abstract 
In an ever-changing world of foreign relations, understanding how world leaders process 
and interpret events will be useful in predicting potential official reactions. The focus of 
the current study is on the U.S. Congress, who, despite the power they can exert on world 
politics, is an understudied population. Language, more specifically word frequency in 
congressional speeches, is one way to measure how people approach situations. 
Therefore, I examined speeches on foreign policy issues (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) to 
elucidate Congressional thinking. Using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
developed by (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007), the linguistic constructs of complex 
thinking, cognitive processing, and psychological distancing, were examined with 
nonparametric regression to determine if language changed over time in response to real 
world events. The constructs of categorical thinking, honesty, and status were examined 
to determine if party differences changed over time. Changes were found in complex 
thinking and psychological distancing, with the majority of changes happening around 9-
11 and the Arab Spring. A few major party differences in honesty and status will also be 
discussed.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The foreign policy of any nation has far-reaching consequences both domestically 
and abroad. Foreign policy encompasses the choices a nation makes in relation to entities 
outside the nation (Kaufman, 2010). Numerous studies have sought to elucidate the role 
of the executive (Crichlow, 2005; Dyson, 2008; Dyson & Preston, 2006) in creating 
policy and the attitudes of the public toward those policies (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; 
McCleary, Nalls, & Williams, 2009; Sahar, 2010). Few studies, however, have examined 
the role of the legislature in shaping foreign policy. This dearth is unfortunate, as the U.S. 
Congress has the power to declare war, limit the military engagement, and to control 
defense spending (Phelps & Boylan, 2002). Congress also reflects public opinion. 
Ansolabehere and Jones (2010) found that, generally, citizens have accurate perceptions 
of how their congressmen and women are voting and that approval of congressmen and 
women is influenced by how well their voting aligns with their constituencies’ 
preferences. Hence, the focus of this study will be on the U.S. Congress due to its 
importance in shaping policy.  
As it is difficult to conduct typical studies with politicians, the language they 
produce is often used to draw conclusions about their attitudes and behaviors in research. 
One problem with many of these studies is size of their sample. Due to the time-
consuming nature of linguistic studies, small groups of texts, such as all the statements by 
one president or one year of congressional speeches, are typically used; thus, restricting 
the conclusions which can be drawn to one person or time period. Automatic content 
analysis, such a tabulation of word frequencies, allows for much larger samples of 
language to be analyzed. However, studies that use this procedure often examine a 
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limited set of topics or policies that politicians address. To expand the literature, the 
current study will use a type of word analysis to explore more complex constructs, such 
as honesty and aggression in language. In this study, I seek to use word frequency 
analysis to understand U.S. congressmen and women’s positions and attitudes toward 
U.S. foreign policy with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Language 
 Language is at the heart of politics. Politicians release daily press statements to 
their constituencies, give speeches on the floor of Congress, and engage in debate with 
others at committee hearings. All discourse is composed of two types of words: content 
and function. Content words reflect the substance of the discourse; these words convey 
ideas. Function words reflect the style of the discourse; these words reflect how the ideas 
are being conveyed. Categories of function words include pronouns and prepositions, 
whereas categories of content words can include concepts (nouns, adjectives) such as 
money and death (Pennebaker, 2011). The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software 
(LIWC; Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007) was developed to 
analyze language for these types words by computing word frequencies for words in 82 
language categories. See Table 1 for categories and examples. Tausczik and Pennebaker 
(2009) provided a review of more than 100 articles which established the link between 
language and psychological constructs such as honesty, group cohesion, and social status. 
These reviewed studies found pronouns and verb tense to be indicative of attentional 
focus. The use of first person pronouns indicated a self-focus and the use of third person 
pronouns indicated an others-focus, while verb tense indicates temporal orientation. 
Furthermore, plural third person pronouns were found to indicate greater social status and 
group cohesion. Language can also fluctuate in response to major events. Tausczik, 
Faasse, Pennebaker, and Petrie (2012) found an increase in the use of death, health, and 
anxiety words in blogs and new outlets following a swine flu outbreak, as well as a 
decrease in positive emotion words.  Fernandez, Paez, and Pennebaker (2009) found an 
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increase in the use of first person pronouns in writing responses from an American 
sample following 9-11, and an increase in the use of social words, third person pronouns, 
and cognitive processes in a Spanish sample following the terrorist attacks in 2004.  
 These and other studies established how word frequencies could be used to 
explain psychological constructs in language. Pennebaker and King (1999) conducted 
several studies to establish the reliability and validity of the LIWC and to explore how 
language is related to larger psychological constructs. Using language samples from three 
different sources (psychiatric patients, college students, and psychological researchers), 
they found the overall reliability of the 82 categories to be .59. In a separate experiment, 
they discovered analyzed the most reliable categories with a factor analysis revealing four 
psychological constructs: Immediacy, Making Distinctions, The Social Past, and 
Rationalization. Whereas language categories give information about the frequency of 
word use, these constructs indicate different language styles reflecting underlying 
psychological processes. See Table 2 for formulas used to derive these factors. 
Pennebaker and King (1999) followed up on these initial studies to determine how these 
language factors related to motivation, personality, and demographic variables. They 
found that Immediacy positively correlated with classroom participation, neuroticism, 
and agreeableness and negatively correlated with need for achievement, openness to 
experience, SAT verbal scores, and need for cognition. Making Distinctions was found to 
be positively correlated with classroom participation and negatively correlated with need 
for affiliation, extraversion, conscientiousness, and positive affect.   
 In a study of blogs following 9-11, Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker (2004) utilized 
similar constructs using the word categories of the LIWC. Cognitive processing is 
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reflected in the use of words such as think and because and indicates the level to which 
the writer or speaker seeks to understand and organize their thoughts. This concept is 
similar to the language factor, Rationalization, found in Pennebaker and King (1999) 
except cognitive processing does not account for emotion. Psychological distancing is a 
measure of the difference of the use of articles and longer words and the use of first-
person singular pronouns, discrepancy words such as would and could, and present tense 
verbs. High levels of psychological distancing indicate an abstract and rational thought 
process whereas low levels of psychological distancing indicate a personal and 
experience-based thought process. Psychological distancing is the opposite of the 
Immediacy factor found by Pennebaker and King (1999). Cohn et al. (2004) examined 
more than 1,000 blogs from an online journal site over a period of time which spanned 
several months before and after 9-11 and found that cognitive processing and 
psychological distancing increased in the two weeks following 9-11. After those two 
weeks, cognitive processing declined below baseline levels, and psychological distancing 
persisted for the entire six weeks of the study following 9-11. Furthermore, they found 
that even blogs, which did not focus on the events of 9-11, still demonstrated these 
language changes to a lesser extent.  
 Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, and Richards (2003) explored the possibility of 
using word frequencies to predict deception. Participants were requested to both tell the 
truth and lie concerning their attitudes on abortion, their friends, or the involvement in a 
mock crime. Deception was predicted by an increase in the use of negative emotion and 
motion words and a decrease in the use of first person singular pronouns, third person 
pronouns, and exclusive words. Word frequency was able to predict deception better than 
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people and better than chance. Bond and Lee (2005) then used the results of the Newman 
et al. (2003) study to classify the truthfulness of prisoners’ statements.  Participants were 
placed into dyads with one participant providing a mix of true and false statements and 
the other participant judging the veracity of the first participant’s statements. Bond and 
Lee found that the Newman et al. formula for deception classified 70% of statements 
correctly.  
 Pennebaker (2011) studied the language of terrorist groups to determine if 
language could predict aggression. Nearly 300 language samples were gathered from four 
Arabic extremist groups, two of which had committed violent terrorist attacks. In addition 
to the categories of the LIWC, Pennebaker also examined honesty, status, categorical 
thinking, and complex thinking. See Table 2 for the computational formulas of these 
constructs. Honesty represents the extent to which language used conveys truthfulness or 
deception. Status represents how the speaker or writer sees themselves in the social 
hierarchy of which they are a part. Categorical thinking represents a distant and static 
style of speaking or writing compared to a more fluid or dynamic style. Complex 
thinking indicated an intellectual or elaborate way of speaking or writing and represents 
the Making Distinctions factor found by Pennebaker and King (1999). Pennebaker (2011) 
found that the violent terrorist groups had less honest language, as well as less categorical 
thinking and less cognitive complexity. Overall, the language differences between violent 
and nonviolent terrorist groups suggested violent groups were more personal and 
charismatic whereas nonviolent groups were more intellectual. Pennebaker also found 
that violent terrorist groups used more simple words, more pronouns, more emotional 
words, and more inclusive words. One month prior to a terrorist attack, these groups used 
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more personal pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and inclusive words while using 
fewer insight words, causation words, discrepancy words, tentative words, and exclusive 
words.  
Politics and Foreign Policy 
 As the purpose of this study is to explore changes in political discourse, it is 
important to discuss how changes in the political environment can impact the behavior of 
politicians, which includes their language. The research in this area generally focuses on 
executives (presidents and prime ministers) and foreign ministers. Leudar, Marsland, and 
Nekvapil (2004) studied the language of George Bush, Tony Blair, and Osama bin Laden 
following 9-11. They found that all three individuals used language to establish an us 
versus them dichotomy to rationalize past events and orient future actions. Bush and Blair 
identified us versus them distinctions based on social, moral, and political grounds, 
whereas bin Laden made these distinctions using religious grounds. Dyson (2008) 
examined British prime ministers parliamentary responses to foreign policy questions 
from 1945-2008 for cognitive complexity markers within their language use. Words 
which indicated high cognitive complexity include apparently, approximately, and 
otherwise; low cognitive complexity words included absolute, all, and overwhelming. 
Dyson found differences between prime ministers and differences in variation such that 
some prime ministers were consistent in their complexity while other prime ministers 
seem to vary their cognitive complexity over time.  
Dyson and Preston (2006) conducted a similar study to examine how the 
cognitive complexity of four U.S. presidents (Truman through Johnson) related to their 
use of historical analogy in the foreign policy statements. High complexity presidents 
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(Eisenhower and Kennedy) were more likely to use sophisticated historical analogies and 
cross-cultural analogies than low complexity presidents (Truman and Johnson). Crichlow 
(2005) studied the policy preferences of U.S. foreign ministers for specific policy 
decisions. He found that conflict-oriented policy preferences were correlated with 
ministers’ distrust and belief in events ruled by chance while cooperative-oriented policy 
preferences were correlated with belief that others will be cooperative, belief in the 
stability of the future, and greater perception of control. With the exception of the belief 
that others will be cooperative, these relationships remain significant even when 
controlling for the level of provocation. To demonstrate the importance of ministers’ 
policy preferences, Crichlow found that the ministers’ policy preference was positively 
correlated with the official policy. Together, these studies demonstrate personal 
characteristics of executives, including their language use, can illuminate foreign policy 
preferences.   
 In addition to politician influence, public attitudes of foreign policy are an 
important area of investigation. Friese, Fishman, Beatson, Sauerwein, and Rip (2009) 
portrayed that the relationship between political orientation and support for the Iraq War 
was mediated by the participant’s attribution of responsibility for the war. Participants 
who were led to believe that the U.S. lied about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) were less likely to support the war than those lead to believe that 
Iraq did posses WMDs. Sahar (2010) studied attributions of responsibility for the war in 
Afghanistan and the Iraq War denoting three major types of attributions: U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East, resentment of American successes, and terrorist personal traits. 
She then examined how these attributions related to patriotism, perceived threat, and 
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support for war. In a 2001 sample, blind patriotism, which represents loyalty to one’s 
nation regardless of other factors, was positively correlated with the resentment 
attribution, perceived threat, support for the war in Afghanistan, and belief in the success 
of the War on Terror, and negatively correlated with the U.S. foreign policy attribution. 
Constructive patriotism positively correlated with all three attributions and perceived 
threat. In a 2005 sample, the correlations with blind patriotism remained the same except 
that the resentment attribution no longer correlated with blind patriotism. Constructive 
patriotism positively correlated with the U.S. foreign policy and terrorist traits attributes 
and negatively correlated with support for the Iraq War. Over time, blind patriotism, 
perceived threat, support for the war in Afghanistan, belief in success decreased while 
attributions of U.S. responsibility for the wars increased. 
 Cohrs and Moschner (2002) studied German students’ attitudes toward the 
Kosovo War and found that general attitudes toward war, which consisted of diffuse 
political support (conceptually similar to blind patriotism), militarism, and 
authoritarianism, positively correlated with support for the war in Kosovo. They also 
found evidence of a confirmation bias, such that those who were against the war 
selectively sought out information which reinforced those attitudes. McCleary et al. 
(2009) conducted a similar study of American college students’ attitudes toward the Iraq 
War, and discovered that blind patriotism strongly predicted support for the war while 
militarism and concern for national security predicted support to a lesser extent. 
Constructive patriotism and concern for civil liberties predicted opposition to the war.  
 Though the research on legislatures is much less extensive, a couple studies have 
looked at factors involved in legislatures’ foreign policy preferences, primarily the U.S. 
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Congress. Kriner and Shen (2014) studied political discourse and voting in the U.S. 
House of Representatives pertaining to the Iraq War. They found that, for Democrats, 
antiwar rhetoric positively correlated with the number of war casualties from their 
districts. Furthermore, as the number of casualties from their district increased, 
Democrats were more likely to vote against war measures. Grimmer (2009) examined the 
press releases from U.S. Senators in 2007 to demonstrate how language could illuminate 
their political priorities. He found that committee leaders tend to focus on topics related 
to their committees, that senators focus on topics important to their home districts, and 
that senators from the same state have more similar priorities than senators from different 
states. While these two studies how language of legislative bodies can be examined, 
neither of these studies has examined linguistic styles in the legislature, which will be the 
focus of the current study.  
 Studying political language can be useful in predicting policy position and voting 
amongst politicians demonstrated by the following studies. Laver, Benoit, and Garry 
(2003) studied political discourse from the British, Irish, and German parliaments. Using 
reference texts that provided clear examples of different policy positions, they were able 
to predict policy positions of other political texts. For example, they found that politicians 
favoring less central control of education and health care used the word choice more 
often, while politicians favoring more central control referenced the benefits of central 
planning. Slapin and Proksch (2008) conducted a similar study which incorporated 
changes in positions over time using a liberal-conservative continuum. Using German 
political party manifestos over a span of 15 years, they found that their estimates of 
policy positions correlated highly with other methods of estimated policy positions such 
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as hand-coding methods and expert surveys. Zirn and Stuckenschmidt (2014) used 
similar methods in a study of German politics to determine which members of a political 
coalition were assigned ministry positions. By comparing the linguistic similarity 
between each party’s manifesto and the coalition agreement, they were able to correctly 
classify 74% of the party assignment compared to 47% for a traditional hand-coding 
method. Together these studies demonstrate the usefulness of language to understand 
political policies. In a similar vein, the current study will focus on linguistic constructs to 
examine how real world events can influence policy preferences over time.  
Events in U.S. Foreign Relations 
 Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were named as the “axis of evil” by George W. Bush 
in 2002, and these countries are the target population for this study. These states have 
long been considered rogue states by the U.S and have been listed on the State 
Departments list of terrorist states. All of these nations have directly or indirectly 
engaged in terrorist attacks against Western states, and they have histories of pursuing 
nuclear weapon development as well as major human rights violations (Henriksen, 2012). 
Despite this, Caprioli and Trumbore (2005) found that Iraq is more likely to be the 
instigator of conflict , even though Iraq and North Korea are more likely than other states 
to be involved in conflict, and Iran is no more likely to be involved in conflict than other 
nations. One of the purposes of the current study is to tie changes in congressional 
language to events in U.S. foreign relations with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In order to 
have dates to compare the results of the study, the following sections will outline a brief 
history of U.S foreign relations with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea from the mid 1990s to 
2013 which is the focus of the current study. While the history of U.S foreign relations 
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with the nations under study is exceedingly complex, the purpose of the proceeding 
sections is to provide a timeline of events to which to compare the results of our analyses. 
Furthermore, as the U.S. Congress is the focus of the current study, this timeline focuses 
on the U.S. point of view.  
 Iraq. In the mid to late 1990s, the U.S. took a harsh stance against Iraq for its 
violations of international laws and numerous human rights abuses.(Henriksen, 2012). In 
March 1998, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling for an international criminal 
tribunal against Iraq for numerous human rights abuses, and in August, Congress passed 
a law urging the U.S. President to take appropriate action against Iraq for violation of 
international law. By the end of the year, President Clinton authorized air strikes against 
Iraq deemed Operation Desert Fox (Brigham, 2014). The terrorist attacks of 9-11 greatly 
impacted U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. War hawks in the White House, 
such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, pushed for action based on reports 
suggesting developments of WMDs in Iraq.  British intelligence confirming these reports, 
later found to be incorrect, was a major impetus for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 
2003 (Henriksen, 2012).   
 Following the onset of military presence in Iraq, several important events in the 
war are worth noting. The first is that by May of 2003, President Bush announced the end 
of major combat operations in Iraq. However, in August 2003, insurgents bombed the 
United Nations headquarters in Baghdad killing 22 and prompting the withdrawal of 
several UN organizations (Bergen, 2011). In 2004, support for the war waned as the 
mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners became public knowledge and as doubt was raised about 
the veracity of the intelligence information about the Iraqi possession of WMDs – the 
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major justification for the war ("U.S. Foreign Policy Timeline," 2008).  In January 2005, 
a new Iraqi government was elected; however, the election was highly contested by the 
Iraqi Sunnis (Bergen, 2011). Then, in January 2007, President Bush authorized more 
military personnel to be sent to Iraq and in May of 2007, Congress approved an increase 
in funding for the war ("U.S. Foreign Policy Timeline," 2008). In November 2008, a 
timeline was set for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, and in December 2011, U.S. 
troops officially withdrew from Iraq (Brigham, 2014).  
 Iran. No significant events in U.S.-Iran relations stand out from the mid 1990s to 
early 2000s. Following 9-11, Iran cooperated with U.S. intervention against the Taliban 
in Afghanistan for a short time. Soon after, Iran was once again funding various terrorist 
organization s throughout the Middle East designed to both conduct anti-Western 
activities and to support Shiite organizations in the more liberal Middle Eastern states 
(Henriksen, 2012).  
The Iranian quest to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons cemented 
its hostile relationship with the U.S. In 2002, international nuclear inspections found Iran 
to be in violation of international nuclear agreements. Iran refused to back down from its 
uranium enrichment program, which stalled any negotiated with the West. Iran finally 
suspended its nuclear activities in 2004. The nuclear program was quickly restarted 
however in 2006 by newly elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. New sanctions 
against Iran were implemented in 2007. In response to President Obama’s requests to 
reopen diplomatic talks, Iran test fired a long-range missile. Civil unrest broke out in Iran 
in 2009 that quelled within the year, during which the U.S. remained neutral. In 2010, 
U.S. adopted stricter sanctions against Iran blacklisting many Iranian banks for funding 
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nuclear weapon development. The numerous protests of the Arab Spring in 2011 
prompted further U.S. concern in the Middle East the possibility of Iranian influence 
expanding in the region materialized.  Continued Iranian efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons keep the U.S. wary of the theocratic nation (Henriksen, 2012).  
 North Korea. The timeline for U.S.-North Korean relations is basically a cycle of 
agreements and agreement violations. In 1994, under the new North Korean leader, Kim 
Jong Il, an agreement was reached to halt North Korea’s nuclear quest. Relations 
stabilized for a time, but heated up again in 1998 when North Korea test-fired a long 
range missile and seemed to be violating the nuclear arms agreement (Henriksen, 2012).   
 U.S. attention was quickly diverted to Afghanistan and Iraq following 9-11, 
however, evidence of North Korea’s steadily developing nuclear program kept relations 
tense. In 2005, after two years of negotiations with the Six-Party Talks, an agreement was 
finally reached with North Korea whereby they agreed to abandon their nuclear quest and 
readmit UN inspectors in return for foreign aid. Unfortunately, the agreement coincided 
with the discovery by the U.S. Treasury that North Korea had been counterfeiting U.S. 
currency prompting the U.S. to blacklist the bank through which North Korea had been 
laundering money. North Korea retaliated in 2006 by firing several missiles and carrying 
out a nuclear test violating their new agreement. In 2007, a new agreement was reached 
which included a new provision that the U.S. would remove North Korea from the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism. The agreement came to naught however, as North Korea 
refused to hold up its end even after the U.S. released North Korean assets frozen in the 
blacklisted bank. In 2008, the U.S. discovered that North Korea had aided Syria in 
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developing its own nuclear program. Further negotiations were attempted, but by the time 
President Bush left office in 2009, little progress had been made (Henriksen, 2012).   
 Under President Obama, policy toward North Korea remained mostly the same, 
but North Korean actions spurred the U.S. to action. Violating previous agreements, 
North Korea launched another missile with crashed into the Pacific in April 2009. In 
response, the U.S. went to the U.N. to enforce harsher sanctions, albeit they only partially 
supported by the U.N. North Korea responded by ousting nuclear inspectors and testing a 
nuclear device. The interplay between the U.S. and North Korea has continued in with 
sanctions and retaliations throughout the years. Late 2011, Kim Jong-Un became the new 
leader of North Korea who despite agreeing in 2012 to suspend nuclear testing 
announced plans to launch a satellite (Henriksen, 2012).   
Purpose and Hypotheses 
 The purpose of this study is to examine linguistic changes in the foreign policy 
discourse in Congress pertaining to U.S. relations with Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. 
Specifically, I will explore changes in language reflecting metalinguistic constructs in 
response to major events in foreign relations such as missile launches and major human 
rights violations.  
 Hypothesis 1: Complex thinking, cognitive processing, and psychological 
distancing will increase following acts of aggression perpetrated by Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea.  
 Hypothesis 2: Categorical thinking, honesty, and status will change over time as a 
function of party affiliation.   
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METHOD 
Data Collection 
 Data were collected using the Congressional Record, which is an online archive 
of speeches on the floor of both chambers of Congress available through U.S. 
Government Printing Office. The archive is organized by year, month, day, and chamber 
of Congress. For each day and chamber, a file exists for each debate/speech for that day. 
Each file could have one or multiple speakers. Files with multiple speakers are typically 
debates on specific legislation, such as the Authorization for the Use of Military Force in 
Iraq. Each file is given a title that specifies the subject of the speech/debate. These titles 
were scanned for the keywords Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. These files were 
downloaded as pdfs or text files. 
Sample 
 Senate.  A total of 1024 Senate speeches were collected from the Congressional 
Record available online through the U.S. Government Publishing Office. Of these 
speeches, 943 speeches pertained to relations with Iraq, 57 pertained to Iran, and 24 
pertained to North Korea. Speeches were made by 143 senators over the years 1998 – 
2013. The average word count for the speeches was 1393.93 (SD = 1050.99). Democrats 
made 522 of the speeches, and Republicans delivered 468 of the speeches. The average 
time in office was 17.67 years (SD = 10.88).  
 House of Representatives. From the House of Representatives, 3512 speeches 
were gathered from the Congressional Record. Of these, 3315 speeches were about Iraq, 
172 about Iran, and 25 about North Korea. Speeches were made by 570 congressmen and 
women between 1998 – 2013. The average word count was 745.64 (SD = 946.08). 
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Democrats gave 2100 speeches, and Republicans gave 1412. The average time in office 
was 10.67 years (SD = 8.32).  
 Foreign Affairs Committees. Additionally, 254 speeches were collected from 
the hearings of the Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Of these, 24 pertained 
to Iraq, 134 to Iran, and 96 to North Korea. Speeches were made by 94 members of 
Congress from 1998 to 2013. The average word count was 1111.30 (SD = 1591.95). 
Democrats made 144 speeches, and Republicans made 110 speeches. The average time in 
office was 12.82 years (SD = 9.10). For all venues, multiple speakers/speeches were 
given on the same day, and for analyses, this meant several speeches contributed for to 
the average for that time point. 
Data Processing  
Speech files were then processed to create a readable LIWC format, and each file 
only contained one speaker, day, and region combination.  Cleaned files included no 
labels or long quotes, and obvious spelling errors were corrected. Word frequency 
analysis was then conducted for each file using the LIWC. Further information about 
each speaker was collected and added to the dataset. This information included each 
speaker’s party affiliation, the years they have been in Congress, and the state they 
represented.  
 Metalinguistic Constructs. From the categories included in the LIWC analysis, 
metalinguistic constructs were calculated: honesty, status, complex thinking, categorical 
thinking, cognitive processing, and psychological distancing. See Table 2 for formulas 
for these constructs. These constructs are computed by first calculating the z 
(standardized) scores of the each separate word category, then calculating the formulas 
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provided in Table 2. Therefore, the values for the overall constructs can be interpreted as 
z scores, which sets a construct score of 0 to the average level of that construct across the 
sample. Construct scores from -2 to 2 represent an average range of scores that 95% of 
the speeches would typically fall into. Construct scores less than -2 or greater than 2 
represent speeches significantly lower or higher than average. 
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RESULTS 
Data Analytic Plan 
Function estimation. The proposed hypotheses focused on changes in language 
over a 15-year span of time. As shown in the attached figures, the trend of linguistic 
constructs was not linear during this time period. Therefore, nonparametric regression 
with smoothing splines was used to define the function by estimating the regression line 
at each point around a given interval. The width of this interval, referred to as the 
smoothing parameter or h, can be estimated either subjectively, by choosing a value 
resulting in a smooth curve, or objectively, by using automatic methods such as cross-
validation. Basically, the value of h is the interval over which the function estimates each 
point on the regression line (Bowman, 2006; Faraway, 2006). For the current study, h 
was calculated for each individual model. These h values ranged from 34 to 210 meaning 
that each point was estimated based on the average of speeches over a month to nearly a 
year depending on the model. The current analyses were conducted using the sm package 
in R (Bowman & Azzalini, 2014). Regression analyses were carried out using the 
sm.regression function and the smoothing parameters were estimated using hcv cross-
validation function.  
Hypothesis Analysis. Using the regression line, estimated linguistic construct 
scores were analyzed to determine when significant changes in speech patterns occurred. 
Constructs are z-scored, and therefore, the differences between time points or parties 
were compared a zdifference of 2.71 (Bonferroni corrected α = .003 for 15 analyses). 
Initially, separate models were conducted for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea for each 
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construct. However, due to sample sizes, speeches pertaining to Iran and North Korea 
combined for one model per construct.  
Hypothesis 1 
 Complex Thinking. Figure 1 contains the overall regression line for changes in 
complex thinking over time in discourse pertaining to U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq 
with separate lines for Democrats and Republicans. As indicated in Table 3, the first 
wave of changes in categorical thinking was found from March 2000 through October 
2001. These changes were not significantly different during March and September, but as 
shown in Figure 1, Republicans and Democrats diverged dramatically in April 2001 
(zdifference = 3.83). This difference persisted through October 2001 (zdifference = 3.75) 
indicating that Democrats were using significantly more complex thinking during this 
time period. One limitation to these analyses is smaller speech numbers during these time 
periods. The second wave of changes occurred from 2010 to 2013, as shown in Table 3. 
During this time, major party differences emerged. Early in 2011 and 2013, Democrats 
displayed more complex thinking (2011: zdifference = 2.86; 2013: zdifference = 4.17). Early in 
2013, however, this trend switched with Republicans displaying marginally more 
complex thinking (zdifference = 2.26).   
 Figure 2 contains regression line for changes in complex thinking in speeches 
about Iran and North Korea. The same trends existed in discourse about Iran and North 
Korea. The first set of changes occurred from 2000 to 2004. Major party differences 
emerged from late 2001 until late 2004. These differences ranged from zdifference = 2.12 in 
2003 to zdifference = 6.16 in 2002. Throughout this time period, Democrats displayed higher 
levels of complex thinking than Republicans. The second wave of changes occurred in 
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the period of 2010 to 2013 with complex thinking decreasing over this time period. No 
significant party differences emerged during this time.  
 Cognitive Processing. Figure 3 displays the changes in cognitive processing in 
the congressional discourse pertaining to Iraq with separate lines for Democrats and 
Republicans. The overall level of cognitive processing changed very little over time 
(Table 3). However, significant party difference emerged in July 1998 (zdifference = 4.28) 
with Democrats displaying more cognitive processing. Figure 4 shows changes in 
cognitive processing in congressional discourse about Iran and North Korea. Over the 
time studied here, minor changes occurred; however, the overall level of cognitive 
processing never varied more than one point away from the mean of 0. Likewise, party 
differences over time never exceeded 2.20 points.  
 Psychological Distancing. Figure 5 displays changes in psychological distancing 
in discourse about Iraq. Only one wave of changes occurred for psychological distancing 
from 1998 to 2000. Over the rest of the time studies, distancing remained unchanged and 
party differences were small to non-existent. Figure 6 shows changes in discourse 
pertaining to Iran and North Korea. As shown in Table 3, psychological distancing varied 
widely throughout the time period under study. Furthermore, large party differences were 
also apparent throughout most of the time period. Through 1999 and 2000, Democrats 
were less distant (August 1999: zdifference = 3.86; October 2000: zdifference = 3.61). In 2001, 
Democrats became much more distant (zdifference = 9.86). Throughout 2002, Democrats 
returned to being less distant (zdifference = 4.36). In 2004, Democrats became more distant 
once again (zdifference = 5.29). Party differences waned from 2005-2009. In July 2010, 
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party difference increased again with Democrats became more distant (zdifference = 3.36), 
whereas in December 2010, Republicans were more distant (zdifference = 5.72).  
Hypothesis 2  
 Categorical Thinking. Figure 7 displays party differences in categorical thinking 
over time for foreign policy discourse about Iraq. Throughout the time period, party 
differences were relatively small. The largest party differences occurred in March 2010 
(zdifference = 2.48) where Democrats used more categorical thinking and in July 2013 
(zdifference = 2.00) where Republicans used more categorical thinking. Figure 8 shows party 
differences in categorical thinking for discourse about Iran and North Korea. The largest 
party differences occurred in January 2004 (zdifference = 3.01) wherein Democrats used 
more categorical thinking, and January 2011 (zdifference = 3.28) switched to where 
Republicans used more categorical thinking.  
 Honesty. Figure 9 presents party differences in honesty for discourse about Iraq. 
Democrats demonstrated significantly more honest language from December 1999 to 
October 2000 with differences ranging from 2.86 to 4.28. Differences increased again to 
2.62 in February 2010 with Democrats still showing more honest language. Figure 10 
presents party differences in discourse about Iran and North Korea. The largest difference 
(zdifference = 4.61) was found in May 2013 such that Republicans displayed more honest 
language. For October 2002, there was a difference of 2.77 with more honest language 
from Democrats, and for September 2012, there was a switch to more honest language 
from Republicans (zdifference =  2.63).  
 Status. Figure 11 shows party differences in status in foreign policy discourse 
about Iraq. The largest differences were found in 2000 and 2001. In June 2000, the 
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difference was 3.44 with Republican language showing higher status, whereas in May 
2001, Democratic language showed higher status (zdifference =3.64). Figure 12 presents 
party differences in status in discourse about Iran and North Korea. The largest difference 
occurred in June 2001 (zdifference = 15.44) with Republican language displaying much 
higher status than Democratic language. Large differences also occurred in February 
2011 (zdifference = 2.84) with Republican language indicating higher status and July 2013 
(zdifference = 2.96) with Democratic language portraying higher status.  
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DISCUSSION 
  Results indicated that, instead of acts of aggression impacting congressional 
language, larger world events appeared to have the most impact (contrary to Hypothesis 
1). For Iraq, changes were expected from 2002 to 2008 as those are when most acts of 
aggression by Iraq occurred as well as most major developments of American military 
operations took place. Instead, major fluctuations were seen in complex thinking and 
psychological distancing in 2000 and 2001. Specifically, in 2000, complex thinking 
increased while psychological distancing decreased. Then, those trends reversed in 2001 
albeit complex thinking increased again in October 2001. Given the timing, these changes 
seem unrelated to any event in foreign affairs; however, these changes do seem to line up 
with the 2000 U.S. presidential election. Operation Desert Fox and the issues arising from 
increasingly hostile relations with Iraq could also have influenced these changes.  The 
changes in complex thinking later in 2001 were likely due to 9-11. Additionally, changes 
were also observed in complex thinking and cognitive processing from 2010-2013. These 
changes were likely indirectly influenced by the Arab Spring, whose rebellions created 
concern for uprisings and conflicts with Iran and Iraq which could have destabilized both 
nations.  
 For Iran and North Korea, no changes were found for cognitive processing. For 
complex thinking, many changes occurred in 2001-2002 varied by party. Due to the 
timing, these changes were likely influenced by the presidential election and 9-11. The 
Arab Spring likely influenced decreases in complex thinking occurring throughout 2010-
2013. For psychological distancing, changes from 1999-2001 could be attributable to the 
presidential election, while changes from late 2001-2002 can be attributed to 9-11. Iran’s 
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violations of nuclear arms agreements may explain changes found in 2002-2004, and 
finally, increases in distancing from 2011-2013 were likely due to the Arab Spring.  
 As for Hypothesis 2, party differences in categorical thinking, honesty, and status 
emerged, again not necessarily due to acts of aggression. For categorical thinking, the 
largest, and possibly only significant, party difference occurred in 2011 potentially 
influenced by the Arab Spring and/or aggressive actions by North Korea toward South 
Korea. Republicans used more categorical thinking at this time, indicating they may have 
viewed the situation in more black and white terms. For honesty, the largest party 
difference was found in 1999-2000 with Democrats using more honest language; it seems 
likely that this difference may have been more influenced by the domestic concerns of the 
upcoming presidential election than foreign policy problems. For status, the largest party 
difference occurred in 2001 with Republican language reflecting higher status; once 
again, given the context, this likely reflects concerns with the presidential election.  
 Overall, three events were potential candidates that may have impacted 
congressional foreign policy discourse: the 2000 election, 9-11, and the Arab Spring. 
Preceding the 2000 election, complex thinking increased, attributable to candidates 
working to foment a cogent policy towards Iraq where action might have been necessary. 
Psychological distancing decreased during this time,  wherein candidates would have 
been forming policies of engagement for these issues. After the election, complex 
thinking decreased and psychological distancing increased indicating a more abstract, but 
less elaborate way of thinking. Following 9-11, complex thinking increased, indicating 
members of Congress engaging and planning a response to the catastrophe. Psychological 
distancing decreased, wherein members of Congress were forced to engage rather than 
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withdraw. Following the Arab Spring, complex thinking decreased but only for discourse 
about Iran and North Korea; this finding could either be a lack of engagement with the 
foreign policy issues with those nations or a simplification of those issues in the face of 
problems elsewhere in the region. Psychological distancing increased in discourse about 
Iran and North Korea suggesting disengagement with the foreign policy problems of 
those nations, and this finding could be attributed to the potential for U.S. engagement 
elsewhere as the Arab Spring grew and became more complex.    
 Congressional language was highly variable, changing quickly and often. 
However, these changes do seem to have some connection to real world events, and these 
changes could help us to understand how decision makers are responding 
psychologically, and possibly officially, to these events. For example, as Operation 
Desert Fox was happening, there was a decrease in psychological distancing in discourse 
about Iraq. This was followed by an increase in distancing and an increase then decrease 
in complex thinking. For the discourse about Iran and North Korea, in 2002, there is also 
an increase in distancing and a decrease in complex thinking following a violation of 
nuclear arms agreements by Iran. Finally, following the Arab Spring, there is another 
increase in distancing and decrease in complex thinking. While more study would be 
necessary to understand these relationships, it is possible that higher levels of distancing 
and lower levels of complex thinking could signal a desire to deescalate a potential 
conflict. Policy makers could be using simple, abstract language to show there is 
insufficient justification for responding aggressively to a foreign relations event. If this is 
the case, then policy makers could be shown ways in which they could help to deescalate 
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conflict before they start. This is just one example, and hopefully, with further study, 
language could reveal more ways to benefit policy makers in making better decisions.  
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Table 1 
LIWC Categories and Examples 
Constructs Examples 
Pronouns 
First person singular I, me, mine 
First person plural we, us, our 
Second person you, your 
Third person singular she, him 
Third person plural they, their 
Verbs 
Past tense went, had 
Present tense is, does 
Future tense will 
Other 
Adverbs very, really, quickly 
Articles a, an, the 
Prepositions to, with, above 
Conjunctions and, but, whereas 
Negations no, not, never 
Quantifiers few, many, much 
Social-Emotional 
Social processes talk, they 
Positive emotion love, nice 
Negative emotion hurt, hate 
Constructs Examples 
Cognitive Mechanisms 
Insight think, know 
Causation because, effect 
Discrepancy should, would 
Tentative maybe, perhaps 
 34 
Certainty always, never 
Inhibition block, stop 
Inclusive with, include 
Exclusive but, without 
Personal Concerns 
Achievement hero, win 
Money cash, owe 
Religion church, mosque 
Death bury, kill 
Relativity 
Motion arrive, go 
Space down, in 
Time end, until 
 
Note. These categories were selected from the larger LIWC output offerings as the most 
common categories used in research.   
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Table 2 
Metalinguistic Construct Formulas 
Construct Formula Reference 
Honesty 
I-words + words/sentence + big words + 
exclusives + conjunctions + insight + time 
+ motion – discrepancies – social – you – 
impersonal pronouns – positive emotion 
Newman, 
Pennebaker, Berry, 
& Richards (2003) 
Status we-words + you-words – I-words Pennebaker (2011) 
Categorical thinking articles + prepositions + big words – verbs Pennebaker (2011) 
Complex thinking 
exclusive + conjunctions + words/sentence 
+ negations + insight + cause-inclusive 
Pennebaker (2011) 
Cognitive processing insight + causation 
Cohn, Mehl, and 
Pennebaker (2004)  
Psychological 
distancing 
articles + big words - I-words – 
discrepancy – present tense verbs 
Cohn et al. (2004) 
Note. The formulas listed are based on the z scores of the LIWC categories percentage of 
the document.  
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Table 3 
Construct z-scores over time 
Country Construct 2000s 2010s 
Iraq 
Complex Thinking 
March 2000 (1.36) 
September 2000 (4.61) 
April 2001 (4.56) 
October 2001 (-0.66) 
March 2010 (-1.39) 
February 2011 (1.65) 
January 2012 (-2.03) 
Cognitive Processing 
July 1998 (0.60) 
October 1999 (.50) 
October 2001 (-0.83) 
June 2002 (0.50) 
May 2012 (-0.66) 
January 2013 (-2.30) 
Psychological 
Distancing 
March 1998 (1.33) 
May 2000 (-7.84) 
November 2000 (-3.68) 
none 
Iran/North 
Korea 
Complex Thinking 
August 2000 (0.81) 
April 2001 (0.45) 
December 2001 (0.66) 
June 2002 (2.37) 
September 2004 (-1.06) 
July 2010 (1.21) 
July 2013 (-3.29) 
Cognitive Processing none none 
Psychological 
Distancing 
September 1998 (2.04) 
August 1999 (-2.50) 
October 2000 (0.99) 
July 2001 (0.55) 
February 2002 (-1.50) 
October 2002 (-3.56) 
June 2004 (0.61) 
March 2005 (-2.37) 
November 2007 (1.23) 
July 2010 (-0.76) 
December 2010 (1.05) 
May 2013 (3.72) 
Note. Overall z-scores for each time point are presented in parentheses.  
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Figure 1. Changes in complex thinking in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign 
policy with Iraq over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 2 
Changes in complex thinking in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with 
Iran and North Korea over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 3 
Changes in cognitive processing in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with 
Iraq over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 4 
Changes in cognitive processing in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with 
Iran and North Korea over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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 Figure 5 
Changes in psychological distancing in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy 
with Iraq over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 6 
Changes in psychological distancing in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy 
with Iran and North Korea over time. Points represent individual speeches given. Area 
where dotted line]goes off the graph is a break in the line.  
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Figure 7 
Party differences in categorical thinking in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign 
policy with Iraq over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 8 
Party differences in categorical thinking in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign 
policy with Iran and North Korea over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 9 
Party differences in honesty in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with 
Iraq over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 10 
Party differences in honesty in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with 
Iran and North Korea over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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Figure 11 
Party differences in status in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with Iraq 
over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
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 Figure 12 
Party differences in status in congressional speeches about U.S. foreign policy with Iran 
and North Korea over time. Points represent individual speeches given. 
 
